TRUST

There was a time early in the founding years of our Democracy that store of value was the best measure of Trust.  Early savers were savers that put excess savings into real estate.  A home, extension of their present home, a farm and or a extension to their present farm.  The farms would buy better newer equipment as a method to increase their return.  The currencies of the past were gold or silver.  There was no fiat currency backed by any Full Faith and Credit.  When paper currency was added it too was backed by the gold or silver behind it.  Well before the formation of the Federal Reserve System, banks were local institutions who issued their own currency.  A holder of such a note for a specific amount, could go into the bank who issued the note and demand the gold or silver backing their note.  It is here when banks began to have Trust and Faith issues.  Banks gave loans to businesses and individuals that had a pay back in time.  The savings and notes were backed by gold or silver, but in many instances there was not enough gold and silver to back all the savings and notes in circulation.  The gold and silver were part of loans issued by the bank.  At any moments notice a RUN on the bank could occur.  Notes could not all be redeemed, nor could all savings accounts been returned; until all loans were called and paid off.  The result was a bank failure.  

Then came the concept of a fait currency, no backing of gold or silver.  Just the Full Fait and Credit of the U.S. Government.  Banks were forbidden to issue their own currency.  This became the Provence of the U.S. Treasury Department.  

When those failures came about in the past, the populace went back to their old ways of saving.  They bought real estate, the kept gold or silver at home in a save, under the bed or under a floor board.  In both examples they were able to keep their eye on their accumulated savings.  A rather complicated system of having your gold weighed when buying a property or buying food and equipment.  But much safer than a local bank which could fail or be robbed.

We have seen in our past recent history going back 100 years, that even with the Full Faith and Credit of the U.S. Government with the FDIC there are still bank runs.  The basic cause of all those situations was not enough liquid assets to meet demand or liquidations.  As in recent experience Silicon Valley Bank was taken over by the FDIC, just as Washington Mutual was.  In the recent experience with Silicon Valley Ban, a buyer came in for the loans and deposits.  The rest of the bank is up for the best bidder.  So far their are none.

Silicon Valley Bank is a local experience.  It served the technology industry, just like Texas Bank's served the Oil and Oil Services Industry, failures occurred during this period when the price of oil collapsed.  As in Texas, Silicon Valley had reverberations across the world.  Today we have our failures locally reverberating in Europe as Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse and UBS are now in question.

As before the TRUST goes back to what was historic.  The trust in Real Estate, Gold, Silver and today Crypto Currencies.  You can add to that currencies as the Japanese Yen and US Treasury Bonds.

Real Estate has a unique position in the Safety Net.  There are over priced areas; just as their are under priced areas.  The difference between the two areas is the area's economic situation; matched with affordability.

Technology has been the driving force of growth.  Today that growth has ended.  Layoffs, relocations and taxes have caused weak prices in Arizona (Phoenix), Texas (Austin), California (San Francisco, SanJose), Washington State (Seattle), Oregon (Portland).  

In our area this price weakness is held up by the flow of funds from large savings accounts to real estate.  There is a low inventory that becomes lower with every day new listing are less than Contingent, Pending and Sold transactions.  This leads to a decline in inventory.

To give an example, I watch the new listings, contingent, pending and sold properties in an area from South San Francisco to Los Altos.  On a daily basis there are more homes sold, contingent and pending than there are new listings.  ( See chart at end of Newsletter)

When I take the sold properties and examine them one by one I find another variation.  The more work need to be done the lesser the chance of a sale at list.  The more perfect the house the better the chance of getting list and or a premium.

The lesson is the buyers today do not want to fix anything.  They want an up-to-date home, with all landscaping in, newly painted and up-to-date fixtures and appliances.  The further a home moves from that level the less it will command in price.  That takes to a level the the Fix and Flip Buyer comes in to buy at a discount.  They then put the property into prime condition and sell at a premium.  Lesson number one to all sellers, up date, repaint and remodel and re-landscape.  Lesson number two for sellers, discount the pricing to get buyers interested enough to calculate the cost or updating into the appreciated value.  Realize this there are less of Lesson number two buyers, than there are lesson number one buyers.

Lessons for buyers are several.  This is due to the bifurcated market place.  Lesson number one, don't assume a fully modernized home has been built to code.  Check with all the permits, contact the various building departments. The last thing you want to find out is something goes wrong and you find out a permit was never granted or final.  Final means the inspector did not give the builder approval for the work done to code.  Then it is Buyer Beware and the builder is gone or hidden behind various corporations that all disappear.  That leaves the buyer with getting new permits and repairing the errors to code.  Lesson number two, don't expect that you will pay all cash you will get a discount.  There are many all cash buyers in our market place.  Remember the amount of money in the Valley and the demand for "store of value" and the trust in real estate versus a deposit at a bank.  Lesson number three, there are properties for sale that are offered at a discount due to condition.  Review the Termite inspection and the Home Inspection.  The termite inspection will have an estimate to repair.  The Home Inspection will not.  IT is up to you and your realtor to find a contractor willing to give an estimate to repair.  Take the two expenses and add them to the sales price.  If that sales price is equal to or less than the comparable of a recent updated sale, Buy It.  If not, offer what would be a discount that takes it to the value to the market value.  Lesson number four, there are notices of default and auctions scheduled.  Those home owners who were laid off and have fallen behind on their mortgage payments are good candidates for the discounted purchase.  Do not forget the "start up" creator who also will find it difficult getting financing now that Silicon Valley Bank is not there.

Here are the result of today's market action:


New Listing (61)
List Price Increased (2)
List Price Decreased (18)
Transaction Fell Through (1)
Listing Back On Market (2)
Contingent (6)
Pending (44)
Changed to Sold (42)
Changed to Rented (0)
Listing Expired (2)
Listing Canceled (4)



As before, call or write for any question you may have and think of me of your "in the know real estate agent"


The Problems are the Path: AND they are Familiar!

* 33 A.D. After property speculation fed by low interest rates led to a crash, the Emperor Tiberius authorized a banking commission to bail out wealthy real estate speculators.

1825. British banks began to fall after falling interest rates goaded them into buying immense quantities assets, including debt issued by Poyais, a fictitious Central American nation invented by a con artist.  The Bank of England lent money "by every possible means and in modes we had never adopted before", a bank director testified.

1882. The Paris stock market crashed, and its membership of brokers ran out of capital.  With Government approval, the French central bank made an emergency loan of 80 million franc, preventing Paris bourse from going bust.

1890 The giant British bank Baring Brothers & Co collapsed after gouging on Argentine bonds right before the South American country defaulted on its debt.  To stem a panic, the Bank of England swiftly lent Baring's 75 million pounds and coaxed private banks into pledging an additional 17 million pounds to cushion potential losses.

* Courtesy of the Wall Street Journal Saturday/Sunday March 18, 2023

History Continues the same repeat in the US

1998  The FED engineers a $3.6 Billion rescue to Hedge Fund Long Term Capital Management

2001. The FED slashes interest rates after the collapse of internet stocks

2008-09 The FED backs Money Market Funds with $50 Billion pouring more than $425 Billion into troubled banks and industrial companies.  The FED buys more that $1.7 Trillion in government securities.

The FED follows up with lowering interest rates to near Zero, while other countries go below 0.

2020-2020 The FED buys additional Treasuries to calm the Covid-19 Pandemic.  To total of the  the FED Balance hit a high of just over $9 trillion.  All the money added to the money supply and created the largest accumulation of savings of Americans in the History of the United States.

The Great Depression of 1929 and aftermath saw bank failure and the lack of trust in bank permeated the psyche of most Americans1

The failure of trust in banking created a drive by American into assets that have been part of history's faith in store. of value back from before Tiberius to the present day.  The assets were Gold, Real Estate, Collectibles.  

Today the American Dream will be fed by continued lack of faith in the banking system,  Silicon Valley Bank, Signature Bank, First Republic will be just the start of the cause of the failures.  The cause being the ultra low rates and the failure of the FED to supervise banks and their investment policies, the failure to comprehend the real cause of the crisis the ultra low rates and the over zealous rise in those rates.

The fall in stocks is a familiar trait after a bank failure.  The demand for gold an old standby of faith and the demand for real estate is visible today.

Since the Bailout a number of homes in our area listed went over list.  Agents set offering dates.  Price sold went over list.  Cash buyer predominated the buyers.

Now there is the other side of the coin.  It is not only the good there is a bad.  Foreclosure notices and auctions scheduled are increasing in Redwood City and San Carlos.  A review of those being notified are surprising, from start up venture capitalist to professionals.  The mortgages they hold are not surprising: negative amortization loans, adjustable rate mortgages, reverse mortgages.  Those mortgages reflect the errors of the banks bailed out.  The rate of return or income, could not meet the cost of the new mortgages.

Take in mind the next wave to potentially jolt consumers/investors. Insurance Companies issuing Fixed Rate Annuities.  This is an easy forecast.  An annuity offers a fixed rate of return to the investor tax deferred.  the annuity is funded with fixed instruments such as bonds.  The spread between to rate offered the income earned is profit.  The problem is the with the rise in interest rates the annuity is below market rates. Investors can swap annuities to another higher yielding annuity without incurring taxes.  The result is the Issuance company must sell the bonds backing the specific annuity being redeemed any losses insufficient to cover the redeemed amount  to provide redemption made up of sale proceeds plus insurance company reserves.  At some point the insurance company will run out of reserves and there could be another set of failures for the FED to assume.

The real estate owner will continue to come home or own income property and pay their fixed 30 year mortgage without worry.

Remember it is your Real Estate!

New Listing (61)
List Price Increased (2)
List Price Decreased (18)
Transaction Fell Through (1)
Listing Back On Market (2)
Contingent (6)
Pending (44)
Changed to Sold (42)
Changed to Rented (0)
Listing Expired (2)
Listing Canceled (4)





Follow up to Silicon Valley Bank Bailout

 Matt Levine has followed up with commentary on the Silicon Valley Bank Bailout

The banking system is under pressure for what I feel is a "Failure to Supervise".

Bonds, Gold, Crypto have rallied as there is a search for a "store of value"

In reflection on the past 60 years of similar events the stock market collapsed, and investors also fled to real estate as the true store of value.

The rise in interest rates is like the Tide Going Out, you can see who was swimming naked!

Bailouts etc.

I don’t think that anything interesting turns on whether or not this weekend’s resolution of Silicon Valley Bank was a “bailout,” so let’s not discuss that.[1] But when people talk about bank bailouts, what they often mean to talk about is moral hazard, the idea that if the government saves people from the consequences of bad bank behavior, that will encourage more bad bank behavior in the future. And that seems worth talking about.

It is, I think, fair to say that Silicon Valley Bank took some bad risks, and that’s why it ended up failing. It is a bit harder to say exactly what SVB’s bad decision was. A simple answer is “it made a huge bet on interest rates staying low, which most prudent banks would not have done, and it blew up.” Yesterday Bloomberg reported that “in late 2020, the firm’s asset-liability committee received an internal recommendation to buy shorter-term bonds as more deposits flowed in,” to reduce its duration risk, but that would have reduced earnings, and so “executives balked” and “continued to plow cash into higher-yielding assets.” They took imprudent duration risk, ignored objections, and it blew them up.

I think that answer is fine. A more complicated answer would be that they took duration risk, as banks generally do, but their real sin was having a concentrated set of depositors who were uninsured, quick-moving, well-informed, herd-like and very rates-sensitive in their own businesses: If all of your money is demand deposits from tech startups who will withdraw it at the slightest sign of trouble and/or higher rates, you should not be investing it in long-term bonds. This is a more subtle answer than “just hedge your rate risk bro,” and it is arguably more understandable that SVB’s executives would get it wrong,[2] but in any case it certainly ended up being a bad risk.

So if SVB was rewarded for taking these risks that blew it up, that would be bad; that would be “moral hazard.” But the way the Silicon Valley Bank resolution worked is:

  1. SVB was seized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. on Friday, and by Sunday night the FDIC and other regulators announced that all of SVB’s depositors — including those who were above the FDIC’s usual $250,000 insurance limit — would be able to get all of their money back on Monday. So the depositors were fully rescued.
  2. The shareholders, bondholders and executives were not: The executives were removed; the shares, which closed at $267.83 last Wednesday, are almost certainly worth zero[3]; the bonds are also probably impaired and possibly a zero.

What lessons will rational actors take from this? I mean:

  • If you are a depositor — in particular, a business that needs more than $250,000 of cash to operate efficiently — you should be much less concerned about risk-taking by your bank, because if your bank fails the government will probably rescue you.
  • If you are a bank executive or shareholder or probably bondholder, you should be more concerned about risk-taking by your bank, because you have seen that it can lead to executives and shareholders and bondholders getting zeroed, and that the government won’t rescue you if that happens.

And so the question is: Is that moral hazard? Well, not for shareholders and executives and bondholders. I suppose it is moral hazard for depositors, and a resolution of SVB that left depositors with losses would force depositors to pay closer attention to the risks their banks are taking. (Cliff Asness on Twitter: “The moral hazard here is we’ve greatly reduced the incentive for depositors of any size now … to actually give a moment’s thought to the riskiness of where they’re putting their money.”)

But I think the modern bank-regulatory view is that the point of a bank deposit is that you shouldn’t have to worry about it, and that it is a failure of bank regulation if depositors of any size have “to actually give a moment’s thought to the riskiness” of a bank. (Bank deposits are meant to be “information insensitive.”) There are vast areas of life where we don’t worry about moral hazard. We don’t say things like “the moral hazard of food safety regulation is that we’ve greatly reduced the incentive for consumers to give a moment’s thought to the riskiness of their supermarket’s supply chain.” That’s not a thing you’re supposed to think about! 

Similarly the riskiness of a bank’s asset/liability mix is absolutely a thing that lots of people — bank executives, bank directors, bank regulators, bank shareholders, bank derivatives counterparties — are supposed to think about.[4] But not, generally, in 2023, depositors. Opening a bank account, for an individual human but also for a business that needs more than $250,000 in cash to conduct business efficiently, is not meant to be a high-stakes investment decision that requires extensive due diligence.[5] It’s a bank account! It’s just supposed to work.[6]

This is not a universal view. In the olden days, bank depositors did think more about their bank’s creditworthiness, and I suppose there is a market-discipline argument that, like, if depositors monitor creditworthiness then only the good banks will attract deposits and so the bad banks won’t be able to grow and take risks. But in practice I do not think anyone would much like a market where depositors evaluate banks on their creditworthiness. For one thing, doesn’t it sound exhausting? Don’t you have better things to do? For another thing, SVB’s depositors kind of did that: They woke up one day, noticed that SVB’s balance sheet was bad, and withdrew all their money at once, leading to a banking crisis. Why do we want more of that? For a third thing, the likely outcome of a rule like “only deposit money in banks you are sure won’t fail” would probably be to drive more deposits to giant too-big-to-fail banks, which is maybe a fine outcome economically but not likely to be popular.

Still, there really is a moral hazard in banking and in information-insensitive deposits. Schematically, a bank consists of shareholders taking $10 of their own money and $90 of depositors’ money and making some bets (home loans, business loans, bond investments, whatever) with that combined pile of money. If the bets pay off, the shareholders get the upside (the depositors just get their deposits back). If the bets lose, the shareholders lose money (the depositors get their money back before shareholders get anything). If the bets lose really big — if the bank bets $100 and ends up with $50 — then the shareholders lose all their money, but the depositors get their money back: If the bank is left with only $50, the government gives the depositors the other $40.

If you are a rational bank shareholder (or, more to the point, a bank executive who owns shares and gets paid for increasing shareholder value), this structure encourages you to take risk. If you bet $100 on a coin flip and you win, the bank has $200, and the shareholders keep $110 of that, a 1,000% return. If you lose, the bank has $0, and the shareholders lose $10 of that, a -100% return. The expected value of this bet, for the shareholders, is positive. The expected value for the depositors is neutral: Either way they get their $90 back, either from the bank or from the government. The expected value for the government is negative: If the bank wins, the government gets nothing; if the bank loses, the government pays the depositors $90. But the shareholders — really the executives — are the ones who get to decide what bets to take.

(The finance-y way to say this is that the shareholders have a call option on the bank’s assets, struck at the face value of its deposits. An option’s value increases with volatility, so the shareholders should want the assets to be volatile. This is roughly true of every company — the shareholders always have an option on the company’s assets struck at the face value of its debts — but (1) most companies are way less leveraged than banks, so the option is less at-the-money and (2) at most companies the option is *priced*, because the debt comes from bondholders who are information-sensitive and won’t give the shareholders cheap debt if they’re taking wild risks. At banks, because of the (reasonable) social desire to make deposits information-insensitive, the deposits are cheap and the option is not priced.)

This is all true of all banking, to the extent that deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort mechanisms exist, but certainly it is more true when the government expands its protection of depositors. But it is true of all banking, which is why there is so much bank regulation. Because the  standard solution to this problem is regulation and government supervision: The government says to banks “look, we all understand that you are effectively making bets with government money, so we are going to keep a close eye on the bets you are making to prevent you from losing our money.”

The modern view that bank deposits should be safe and information-insensitive kind of goes along with a modern view that banks are public-private partnerships, that a bank is sort of a business partner with the government in taking deposits and providing credit, and that the way the partnership works is that the bank’s executives make the day-to-day decisions but the government has a lot of input into and oversight over those decisions.

On that view, you should probably draw two related conclusions from SVB:

  1. Regulators and supervisors probably should have stopped SVB from taking dumb risks, they missed something, and changes should be made so they don’t miss those same things again.
  2. The regulators’ response to SVB — guaranteeing all depositors, but also the Fed’s Bank Term Funding Program to finance other banks’ bond portfolios at par[7] — increases the value of other banks’ optionality, which encourages them to take more risk, because their deposits are safer. (I suppose this is the real moral hazard concern.) And so there should be more regulatory and supervisory changes to tamp down the other banks’ risks.

The first conclusion seems sort of obvious. If the goal is to make it so depositors don’t have to think about the risks banks are taking with their money, somebody else — the regulators — have to think about those risks instead. I am not going to sit here and tell you what SVB’s regulators and supervisors should have done to prevent its meltdown last week, though I’m sure other people will. But a few points:

  • “The Federal Reserve said Monday it is launching an internal reviewof its supervision and regulation of Silicon Valley Bank after its failure last week.” The report will be released publicly by May 1. So the Fed will eventually tell you what it should have done to prevent SVB’s meltdown.
  • Bank regulators spend a lot of time thinking about liquidity requirements for banks. The idea of liquidity rules is that you think about how much money people might want to take out of the bank at once, and you try to make sure the bank has enough money to give them. Modern banking regulation has rules like the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and net stable funding ratio (NSFR) to try to measure and regulate that risk, but — as Dan Davies wrote in the Financial Times this weekend — the US decided not to apply those rules to even very large regional banks like SVB. I am not sure how much that mattered — most banks don’t have enough liquidity to cover all of their deposits leaving at once, and SVB might have met the requirements — but it’s something regulators will consider. (Raising the liquidity requirements, to account for the speed of modern bank runs, could also be on the table.)
  • More generally, US financial regulation tends to draw a sharp distinction between “systemically important” banks (like JPMorgan Chase & Co.) and just regular banks like SVB. The systemically important banks are regulated and supervised much more strictly than the regular banks, and in recent years the difference has increased as some rules were rolled back for regular banks. This distinction has always struck me as sort of incoherent, because “systemic risk” is not really a property of one bank but of the system. When SVB collapsed, its venture capitalist depositors clamored for a rescue by threatening systemic risk, by arguing that allowing them to lose money would lead to broader panic across lots of banks: SVB wasn’t that big, but an uncontrolled failure at SVB would lead to many other failures at similar banks. They might well have been right! But the obvious conclusion to draw from this is that biggish regional banks like SVB, at least, need to be subject to stricter regulations — the sorts of rules that apply to the big banks — because they are in fact systemically important. Not due to their individual size, but due to the (well known!) fact that a run on one bank can easily lead to runs on other banks.
  • Existing regulations do not seem to be particularly attuned to the risk of bad depositors. Bank regulators have historically given some thought to the question “what sorts of deposits are more likely to put a bank at risk by running all at once,” and they think about the risks of categories like brokered deposits, insured retail deposits, uninsured retail deposits, operational business deposits, etc. But last month US banking regulators put out a “Joint Statement on Liquidity Risks to Banking Organizations Resulting from Crypto-Asset
    Market Vulnerabilities” saying, in essence, that crypto companies are a particularly risky class of depositors and banks should watch out for them. I have argued that venture-backed tech firms are a similarly risky class of depositors, or at least they were for SVB. “Banking organizations are neither prohibited nor discouraged from providing banking services to customers of any specific class or type, as permitted by law or regulation,” the regulators hastened to add. But I wonder if future banking supervision will be more sensitive to things like industry diversification among depositors, or the volatility of depositors’ industries. If all of your depositors are in the same line of business, and if they are sometimes flush with cash and sometimes broke, then your bank is riskier.

The second conclusion is … well, one way to put it is that the post-SVB actions have made bank deposits a lot safer, which is a nice windfall for the shareholders of every other regional bank that has a lot of losses on held-to-maturity securities. And so in exchange for that windfall the regulators should regulate those banks much more strictly, which will make them actually safer (and reduce the government’s exposure to their risks), but will also reduce their profitability.

Another way to put it is:

  • As a matter of moral hazard, rescuing SVB’s depositors is fine;
  • As a matter of moral hazard, zeroing SVB’s shareholders is good; but
  • As a matter of moral hazard, the right thing to do now is to punish other risky banks’ shareholders.

This is tricky! You are sort of … prospectively punishing those shareholders? Punishing them in lieu of letting their banks fail?

What does it mean in practice? Mainly it means what we talked about above, more strictly regulating risk-taking at regional banks to make sure that they don’t cause any systemic problems. Make regional banks do things — raise more capital, hold more short-term safe liquid instruments, turn down risky borrowers and depositors — that lower their risk, but also lower their expected returns on capital. 

But we talked yesterday about the failure of Signature Bank, which is a strange sort of bank failure. It did not particularly seem to be insolvent or experiencing an ongoing bank run on Sunday, but it was seized by the government anyway. Bloomberg’s Max Reyes reports today:

Signature Bank was seized by the government Sunday after regulators lost faith in management, according to New York officials.

“The bank failed to provide reliable and consistent data, creating a significant crisis of confidence in the bank’s leadership,” a spokesperson for the state’s Department of Financial Services said in an emailed statement Tuesday. “The decision to take possession of the bank and hand it over to the FDIC was based on the current status of the bank and its ability to do business in a safe and sound manner on Monday.”

They can just do that! What I said yesterday was:

Every other bank’s shareholders and bondholders and executives will benefit from those measures [that the Fed and FDIC took to rescue SVB’s depositors]. If you are an uninsured depositor at a medium-sized bank that made some dumb rates bets, there is no reason to move your money now; the Fed has made it clear that it will support that bank. This (probably!) takes run risk off the table for those banks, making them less likely to fail, making their stocks and bonds more valuable than they would be if the Fed hadn’t acted to limit contagion. (In actual fact many bank stocks are down big today, though presumably they’d be down more without these measures.) The rescue of Silicon Valley Bank’s depositors comes too late for Silicon Valley Bank’s shareholders, but it’s good for every similar bank’s shareholders.

As a matter of rough justice you could imagine the Fed looking at the most similar bank — arguably Signature, with its huge proportion of uninsured deposits and its exposure to fast-money crypto/tech customers — and saying “no, not you, your shareholders are getting toasted.”

The way for bank regulators to reduce the moral-hazard impact of the SVB rescue is to take some other banks’ shareholders out and shoot them.

Is that what happened? I don’t know! It’s possible that Signature was shut due to a traditional bank run. Reyes reports that “Signature lost 20% of its deposits on Friday”; Signature (and its board member Barney Frank) said that its outflows had stabilized and that it had enough cash, but the New York Department of Financial Services apparently disputes that. But DFS leads with “a significant crisis of confidence in the bank’s leadership.” If you are a bank regulator and you think that a bank is (1) poorly managed and taking bad risks but also (2) not going to disappear because you went and guaranteed all the deposits, you can make it disappear anyway, and arguably you should. 

One other point on this subject. If you are a banking regulator and you think that the regional banks have taken too much risk and are now undercapitalized given their unrealized losses on held-to-maturity securities, then the most obvious next thing to do — after the weekend’s actions of promising to finance those securities at par, but before rewriting any regulations — is to make those banks raise capital to fix their balance sheets. This is good simply as a matter of sound banking: You don’t want your banks to be undercapitalized, so if they are — on whatever accounting measure you prefer — then they should get more capital. It is also good as a matter of punishing shareholders to avoid moral hazard: Bank stocks have been absolutely wrecked, and making banks raise more equity now at these prices will be a painful dilution for existing shareholders.

On the other hand, it’s tricky: Silicon Valley Bank did (more or less) the responsible thing last week by trying to raise equity to shore up its balance sheet, and that’s what brought it down, as people saw the equity raise and panicked. I doubt anyone wants to be the next regional bank to go out with a marketed stock offering. And a bank regulatory climate that is too punitive for shareholders will make it hard for banks to sell more stock, which is the main thing they should be doing.

I guess that is the tension now. Bank regulators want depositors to feel like they are not taking a risk by keeping their money in the bank. They want the banks and their shareholders not to take risks with those depositors’ money. But they do still want shareholders to take the risk of owning bank stock. 

Banking as mystery

I wrote yesterday about the Fed’s Bank Term Funding Program. Banks buy long-term bonds, mark them “held to maturity,” and then when those bonds lose value the banks ignore it for accounting purposes. But that only goes so far: The banks disclose the losses in footnotes to their financial statements, people sometimes notice, and when the losses get too big there are runs. The BTFP is a way for the Fed to take over the job of ignoring those losses instead: The Fed promised to lend against those bonds at 100 cents on the dollar, as though they hadn’t lost value. The Fed is not subject to bank runs. The Fed can credibly ignore those losses; banks can only mostly ignore them.

I also wrote about Tether:

Another possible understanding, though, is that banking requires mystery! My point, in the first section of this column, was that too much transparency can add to the fragility of a bank, that the Fed is providing a valuable service by ignoring banks’ mark-to-market losses.

Byrne Hobart, whose Diff newsletter may or may not have played a role in bringing down Silicon Valley Bank, wrote today that “the frequency of Diff/Money Stuff cross-linking is a good ad hoc measure of financial conditions.” He quotes my point about Tether and goes on:

This post by Interfluidity is a wonderful exposition on the theme, arguing that financial systems overcome the collective action problem that there just aren't that many projects with an attractive level of risk and reward to the person doing them, and that by disguising some of the risk, we can increase the positive externalities. This is an extreme view.

Yes! I think that post (“Why is finance so complex?”) from Steve Randy Waldman at Interfluidity is a classic, I cite it often, and it was what I had in mind as I was writing yesterday. Waldman describes banking as, broadly speaking, an opacity mechanism for credit, a way for society to take a lot of credit risk without the people taking that risk quite knowing that that’s what they’re doing. My point yesterday was that it is also an opacity mechanism for interest rates, a way for society to borrow short and lend long. Sometimes you need to bulk up the opacity though.

In other news, here is “Monetary Tightening and U.S. Bank Fragility in 2023: Mark-to-Market Losses and Uninsured Depositor Runs?” by Erica Xuewei Jiang, Gregor Matvos, Tomasz Piskorski and Amit Seru, dated yesterday:

We analyze U.S. banks’ asset exposure to a recent rise in the interest rates with implications for financial stability. The U.S. banking system’s market value of assets is $2 trillion lower than suggested by their book value of assets accounting for loan portfolios held to maturity. Marked-to-market bank assets have declined by an average of 10% across all the banks, with the bottom 5th percentile experiencing a decline of 20%. We illustrate that uninsured leverage (i.e., Uninsured Debt/Assets) is the key to understanding whether these losses would lead to some banks in the U.S. becoming insolvent-- unlike insured depositors, uninsured depositors stand to lose a part of their deposits if the bank fails, potentially giving them incentives to run. A case study of the recently failed Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) is illustrative. 10 percent of banks have larger unrecognized losses than those at SVB. Nor was SVB the worst capitalized bank, with 10 percent of banks having lower capitalization than SVB. On the other hand, SVB had a disproportional share of uninsured funding: only 1 percent of banks had higher uninsured leverage. Combined, losses and uninsured leverage provide incentives for an SVB uninsured depositor run. We compute similar incentives for the sample of all U.S. banks. Even if only half of uninsured depositors decide to withdraw, almost 190 banks are at a potential risk of impairment to insured depositors, with potentially $300 billion of insured deposits at risk. If uninsured deposit withdrawals cause even small fire sales, substantially more banks are at risk. Overall, these calculations suggests that recent declines in bank asset values very significantly increased the fragility of the US banking system to uninsured depositor runs.

Yeesh! Not now!

The Problems are the Path: SILICON VALLEY BANK..Higher Interest Rates Take No Prisoners

When the FED started raising rates, I stated that the inflation the FED saw was in realty Asset Inflation.  Yesterday March 9, 2023 we saw the results.

The seizing of Silicon Valley Bank, the 15th largest in the United States, was the largest such failure and seizure since the Washington Mutual seizure.  

There will be ramifications!  SVB the darling of the Valley has been one of the Prima's of our area.  One that WHO WAS ANYONE AND who wanted to be SOMEONE mentioned them as "Their Bank" during cocktail parties.  It was the bank that all funds from IPO's and formation funding that the Venture Capitalist put the new business proceed in to await to be drawn during the rise of the new company from birth to growth. 

My thoughts are that History Does Repeat Itself.  This happened in the late 70's and early 80's when higher interest rates caused the abandonment of venture capital funding.  Take a risk or leave your investment money in T-Bills the question is not easy to answer when the future of rates were higher. Now it will especially be the case in future VC promotions

In this case the very people who helped form and allowed SVB to prosper where the ones for its undoing.

Every morning I read the Bloomberg Opinion of Matt Levine.  An old habit as a stock trader, investor and investment manager when it was only on a Bloomberg terminal on my desk.  It was a must read by all Wall Street before the market's opening, just as much as the Wall Street Journal was a must as I sat  at my desk waiting for the Stock Market to open.

I am copying Matt's comments here for all of you to read to understand What Happened?

"Programming note: Money Stuff was supposed to be off today, but: bank run!

SVB

The lesson might be that there are some industries that are bad to bank. Imagine that it was 2021, and someone was like “do you want to start the Bank of Crypto? What about the Bank of Venture-Backed Tech Startups?” You’d be tempted, right? Those industries had so much money! They seemed cool. If you were their bank — if you were the specialized bank that exclusively focused on those industries — influencers on Twitter would tweet nice things about you, and you’d get invited to fancy parties. Also, as their bank, you’d probably find a way to get a cut of growing industries with lots of potential. Provide banking services to tech startups, get warrants in those startups, get rich when they go public. Provide banking services to crypto exchanges, start some sort of blockchain-based payment network, get rich through the magic of saying “blockchain” a lot. 

But the structure of being the Bank of Crypto or Startups was a bit rickety. Traditionally, the way a bank works is that it takes deposits from people who have money, and makes loans to people who need money. The weird problem with focusing exclusively on crypto or startups in 2021 is that they had too much money. If you were the Bank of Startups, the main service that you provided to startups is that equity investors  would give them a truck full of cash and they’d deposit it at your bank. Here is how SVB Financial Group, the holding company of Silicon Valley Bank, describes the vibe of 2021 and 2022 in its Form 10-K two weeks ago:

Much of the recent deposit growth was driven by our clients across all segments obtaining liquidity through liquidity events, such as IPOs, secondary offerings, SPAC fundraising, venture capital investments, acquisitions and other fundraising activities—which during 2021 and early 2022 were at notably high levels.

People kept flinging money at SVB’s customers, and they kept depositing it at SVB. Perfectly reasonable banking service. 

But the customers didn’t need loans, in part because equity investors kept giving them trucks full of cash and in part because young tech startups tend not to have the fixed assets or recurring cash flows that make for good corporate borrowers.[1] Oh, there is some tech-industry-adjacent lending you can do.[2] Tech founders want to buy houses, and you can give them mortgages. Venture capital and private equity funds want to manage liquidity and/or juice their reported return rates by paying for investments with borrowed money rather than drawing from their limited partners, so you can get into the capital-call-line-of-credit business. There are vineyards near Silicon Valley and you can develop an expertise in vineyard financing. And, sure, some of your tech-company customers do need to borrow money, and are creditworthy, and you lend them money and that works out. But there is a basic imbalance. Customer money keeps coming in, as deposits, but it doesn’t go out, as loans.

So you have all this customer cash, and you need to do something with it. Keeping it in, like, Fed reserves, or Treasury bills, in 2021, was not a great choice; that stuff paid basically no interest, and you want to make money. So you’d buy longer-dated, but also very safe, securities, things like Treasury bonds and agency mortgage-backed securities. We talked yesterday about how this worked out at Silvergate Capital Corp., the actual Bank of Crypto. And as of the end of 2022, Silicon Valley Bank, the actual Bank of Startups, had about $74 billion of loans and about $120 billion of investment securities.

Crudely stereotyping, in traditional banking, you take deposits and make loans. In the Bank of Startups, in 2021, you take deposits and mostly buy bonds. Again crudely stereotyping, corporate loans often have floating interest rates and shorter terms, while bonds have fixed interest rates and longer terms. None of this is completely true — there are fixed-rate corporate loans and floating-rate bonds, traditional banking tends to involve making lots of loans (like mortgages) with long-term fixed rates, you can do swaps, etc. — but it is a useful crude stereotype.[3]

Or, to put it in different crude terms, in traditional banking, you make your money in part by taking credit risk: You get to know your customers, you try to get good at knowing which of them will be able to pay back loans, and then you make loans to those good customers. In the Bank of Startups, in 2021, you couldn’t really make money by taking credit risk: Your customers just didn’t need enough credit to give you the credit risk that you needed to make money on all those deposits. So you had to make your money by taking interest-rate risk: Instead of making loans to risky corporate borrowers, you bought long-term bonds backed by the US government.

The result of this is that, as the Bank of Startups, you were unusually exposed to interest-rate risk. Most banks, when interest rates go up, have to pay more interest on deposits, but get paid more interest on their loans, and end up profiting from rising interest rates. But you, as the Bank of Startups, own a lot of long-duration bonds, and their market value goes down as rates go up. Every bank has some mix of this — every bank borrows short to lend long; that’s what banking is — but many banks end up a bit more balanced than the Bank of Startups. At the Financial Times, Robert Armstrong writes:

Few other banks have as much of their assets locked up in fixed-rate securities as SVB, rather than in floating-rate loans. Securities are 56 per cent of SVB’s assets. At Fifth Third, the figure is 25 per cent; at Bank of America, it is 28 per cent. 

For most banks higher rates, in and of themselves, are good news. They help the asset side of the balance sheet more than they hurt the liability side. … SVB is the opposite: higher rates hurt it on the liability side more than they help it on the asset side. As Oppenheimer bank analyst Chris Kotowski sums up, SVB is “a liability-sensitive outlier in a generally asset-sensitive world”.

But there is another, subtler, more dangerous exposure to interest rates: You are the Bank of Startups, and startups are a low-interest-rate phenomenon. When interest rates are low everywhere, a dollar in 20 years is about as good as a dollar today, so a startup whose business model is “we will lose money for a decade building artificial intelligence, and then rake in lots of money in the far future” sounds pretty good. When interest rates are higher, a dollar today is better than a dollar tomorrow, so investors want cash flows. When interest rates were low for a long time, and suddenly become high, all the money that was rushing to your customers is suddenly cut off. Your clients who were “obtaining liquidity through liquidity events, such as IPOs, secondary offerings, SPAC fundraising, venture capital investments, acquisitions and other fundraising activities” stop doing that. Your customers keep taking money out of the bank to pay rent and salaries, but they stop depositing new money. 

This is all even more true of crypto — I mean, the Fed raised rates once and the entire crypto industry vanished?[4] — but it is not not true of startups. But if some charismatic tech founder had come to you in 2021 and said “I am going to revolutionize the world via [artificial intelligence][robot taxis][flying taxis][space taxis][blockchain],” it might have felt unnatural to reply “nah but what if the Fed raises rates by 0.25%?” This was an industry with a radical vision for the future of humanity, not a bet on interest rates. Turns out it was a bet on interest rates though. 

Here’s Bloomberg’s Katie Greifeld:

Silvergate and SVB “in fact are victims of the same phenomenon as Fed tightening extinguishes froth from those parts of the economy with the most excess — and it’s hard to find more excess than in crypto and tech startups,” said Adam Crisafulli of Vital Knowledge.

And my Bloomberg Opinion colleague Paul Davies:

Both crypto and venture capital booms were children of the ultra-low rates of the past decade and a half. Now, rising rates and the shrinking of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet have burst those industry bubbles and increased the competition among banks for funding. 

And so if you were the Bank of Startups, just like if you were the Bank of Crypto, it turned out that you had made a huge concentrated bet on interest rates. Your customers were flush with cash, so they gave you all that cash, but they didn’t need loans so you invested all that cash in longer-dated fixed-income securities, which lost value when rates went up. But also, when rates went up, your customers all got smoked, because it turned out that they were creatures of low interest rates, and in a higher-interest-rate environment they didn’t have money anymore. So they withdrew their deposits, so you had to sell those securities at a loss to pay them back. Now you have lost money and look financially shaky, so customers get spooked and withdraw more money, so you sell more securities, so you book more losses, oops oops oops.[5]

As Armstrong puts it, SVB had “a double sensitivity to higher interest rates. On the asset side of the balance sheet, higher rates decrease the value of those long-term debt securities. On the liability side, higher rates mean less money shoved at tech, and as such, a lower supply of cheap deposit funding.”

Also, I am sorry to be rude, but there is another reason that it is maybe not great to be the Bank of Startups, which is that nobody on Earth is more of a herd animal than Silicon Valley venture capitalists. What you want, as a bank, is a certain amount of diversity among your depositors. If some depositors get spooked and take their money out, and other depositors evaluate your balance sheet and decide things are fine and keep their money in, and lots more depositors keep their money in because they simply don’t pay attention to banking news, then you have a shot at muddling through your problems.

But if all of your depositors are startups with the same handful of venture capitalists on their boards, and all those venture capitalists are competing with each other to Add Value and Be Influencers and Do The Current Thing by calling all their portfolio companies to say “hey, did you hear, everyone’s taking money out of Silicon Valley Bank, you should too,” then all of your depositors will take their money out at the same time. In fact, Bloomberg reported yesterday:

Unease is spreading across the financial world as concerns about the stability of Silicon Valley Bank prompt prominent venture capitalists including Peter Thiel’s Founders Fund to advise startups to withdraw their money. …

Founders Fund asked its portfolio companies to move their money out of SVB, according to a person familiar with the matter who asked not to be identified discussing private information. Coatue Management, Union Square Ventures and Founder Collective also advised startups to pull cash, people with knowledge of the matter said. Canaan, another major VC firm, told firms it invested in to remove funds on an as-needed basis, according to another person.

SVB Financial Group Chief Executive Officer Greg Becker held a conference call on Thursday advising clients of SVB-owned Silicon Valley Bank to “stay calm” amid concern about the bank’s financial position, according to a person familiar with the matter.

Becker held the roughly 10-minute call with investors at about 11:30 a.m. San Francisco time. He asked the bank’s clients, including venture capital investors, to support the bank the way it has supported its customers over the past 40 years, the person said.

Nah, man, you don’t get to be a successful venture capitalist by taking a long view or investing in relationships or being contrarian. I’m sorry, I’m sorry, this is unfair. Of course they were right — Silicon Valley Bank did collapse, and if you got your money out early that was good for you — but that is largely self-fulfilling; if all the VCs hadn’t decided all at once to pull their money, SVB probably would not have collapsed.[6]

But it did:

Silicon Valley Bank collapsed into Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. receivership on Friday, after its long-established customer base of tech startups grew worried and yanked deposits. 

The California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation in a statement Friday said it has taken possession of Silicon Valley Bank and appointed the FDIC as receiver, citing inadequate liquidity and insolvency.  

The FDIC said that insured depositors would have access to their funds by no later than Monday morning. Uninsured depositors will get a receivership certificate for the remaining amount of their uninsured funds, the regulator said, adding that it doesn’t yet know the amount. 

Receivership typically means a bank’s deposits will be assumed by another, healthy bank or the FDIC will pay depositors up to the insured limit. 

SVB’s capital stack looked roughly like this, as of Dec. 31:

  • A tiny sliver of insured deposits (that is, deposits under the $250,000 FDIC limit), something like $8 billion worth out of $173 billion of total deposits.[7]
  • Roughly $165 billion of uninsured deposits
  • Roughly $13 billion of “short-term borrowings,” meaning mostly Federal Home Loan Bank advances.
  • Roughly $2 billion of long-term FHLB advances.
  • Roughly $3 billion of long-term bonds.
  • Maybe $4 billion of other liabilities, for a total of $195 billion of liabilities.
  • About $3.6 billion of preferred stock.
  • Common stock with a book value of about $12.4 billion and a market value, on Dec. 31, of about $13.6 billion.

It had assets of about $212 billion on that Dec. 31 balance sheet, though since then it has had to sell some assets and mark others down, and it’s not clear what they’re worth today. The California Department of Financial Protection and Innovation cited “inadequate liquidity and insolvency” when it put SVB into FDIC receivership, suggesting that the assets are worth less than the liabilities. The FDIC’s job, in receivership, is “efficiently recovering the maximum amount possible from the disposition of assets” to distribute to creditors.

One obvious question is: If you are “another, healthy bank” working through this weekend to buy SVB and assume its deposits, how much would you pay for the assets, which were worth $212 billion in December?[8] I am pretty sure the answer is higher than $8 billion, the amount of insured deposits: The FDIC will not be on the hook for the insured deposits. The $15 billion of FHLB advances are also quite senior and will presumably be no problem to pay back.

I would also guess — not investing or banking advice! — that the answer will also turn out to be higher than $188 billion, which is the total amount of deposits plus FHLB advances. I say this not because I have done a detailed analysis of SVB’s assets but because it seems bad for the FDIC to wind up a big high-profile bank in a way that causes significant losses for depositors, including uninsured depositors. There was a run on SVB in part because there hasn’t been a big bank run in a while, and people — venture capitalists, startups — were naturally worried that they might lose their deposits if their bank failed. Then the bank failed.

If it turns out to be true that they lose their deposits, there could be more bank runs: Lots of businesses keep uninsured deposits at lots of banks, and if the moral of SVB is “your uninsured transaction-banking deposits can vanish overnight” then those businesses will do a lot more credit analysis, move their money out of weaker banks, and put it at, like, JPMorgan. This could be self-fulfillingly bad for a lot of weaker banks. My assumption is that the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the banks who are looking at buying SVB all really don’t want that. If you are a bank looking at buying SVB, and you do a detailed analysis of its assets and conclude that they are worth $180 billion, and you come to the FDIC and say “I will take over this bank and pay the uninsured depositors 95 cents on the dollar,” the FDIC is going to look at you and say “don’t you mean 100 cents on the dollar,” and you are going to say “oh right yes of course, silly me, 100 cents on the dollar.”[9]

Maybe I’m wrong about that, but if I am it’ll be bad!

Above that, though, I have no idea. The stock closed at $106.04 per share yesterday (a $6.2 billion market cap, roughly 50% of book value), and was halted today. The preferred was trading at about 60 cents on the dollar yesterday, also closed today. Byrne Hobart wrote the bull case yesterday:

The simple way to look at SVB from an investing perspective is to separate the ongoing business from the balance sheet for a moment, and ask: what premium does SVB's business deserve to book value, in a hypothetical world where they didn't make a massive rates bet? Over the last twenty years, they've traded at an average of 2.3x tangible book value, and generally at a premium to their banking peers. So a simple way to value the business is to say that the fair value of the business is generally ~100 cents on the dollar in liquidating value and another ~130 cents on the dollar in franchise value. If that liquidating value has been vaporized by a rates bet, the surviving business is still worth a premium to book.

But that was yesterday, and the franchise value melts pretty quickly when you go into FDIC receivership. The bear case is … well, back in November, when crypto exchange FTX was still looking for a rescue (it never found one), I wrote that the traditional price for that sort of rescue is “we will buy your exchange, make sure that all your customers are made whole, and give you a Snickers bar in exchange for 100% of the equity.” That may be where this is heading.

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[1] Similarly in crypto, on 2021, crypto exchanges had tons of cash that they needed to park at a bank, but were not really in the business of taking loans from banks. There was a lot of lending in the crypto world, but it was all loans secured by Bitcoins and stuff and that is mostly too spicy for a bank; it was mostly done by crypto shadow banks (including exchanges themselves). Though Silvergate did some of it.

[2] Here I am sort of summarizing SVB's discussion of its loan portfolio on pages 70-71 of the 10-K.

[3] Oh it’s way too crude. Here is “Banking on Deposits: Maturity Transformation without Interest Rate Risk,” by Itamar Drechsler, Alexi Savov and Philipp Schnabl, in the Journal of Finance in 2021, making the case “that maturity transformation does not expose banks to interest rate risk — it hedges it,” even in a model where banks lend long at fixed rates, because depositors are not very sensitive to interest rates.

[4] Oh I am exaggerating for effect, please do not email me to be like “by summer 2022 there had been a string of actual and projected Fed rate increases” or “actually there is still crypto,” I know.

[5] This oversimplifies the mechanics of how you lose money, and I recommend Marc Rubinstein's explanation today. Basically SVB ended up with a large portfolio of held-to-maturity bonds with an average duration of 6.2 years at the end of 2022, “and unrealised losses snowballed, from nothing in June 2021, to $16 billion by September 2022.” These losses “completely subsumed the $11.8 billion of tangible common equity that supported the bank’s balance sheet,” meaning that SVB was technically insolvent. But mark-to-market losses on held-to-maturity bonds don't count for bank accounting purposes; the theory is that you will just hold the bonds until maturity, they will pay back par, and you won't have any losses. So SVB was still solvent and fine. “Sell even a single bond out of an HTM portfolio, however, and the entire portfolio would need to be re-marked accordingly”: If you have bonds in your held-to-maturity portfolio, you have to be really confident you can hold them to maturity. SVB’s bonds kept maturing, providing cash to pay out depositors who wanted their money back. But: “What neither the CEO nor the CFO anticipated, however, was that deposits might run off faster” than the bonds. They did, SVB sold its available-for-sale bonds, it wasn’t enough, and here we are.

[6] Other things might have prevented its failure. Daniel Davies points out that Silicon Valley Bank, though it is big, is not quite big enough to be subject to the Federal Reserve’s post-2008 liquidity regulations, which would have made it more, you know, liquid.

[7] The FDIC’s statement says “At the time of closing, the amount of deposits in excess of the insurance limits was undetermined,” and presumably the mix has shifted since Dec. 31.

[8] They were not: Again, that was the book value, and the unrealized losses on the held-to-maturity bonds would reduce that. On the other hand, maybe they've gone up since then? Byrne Hobart tweeted: "One irony of all this is that a flight to safety is disproportionately good for exactly the long-duration low/no-credit risk stuff that caused this problem in the first place."

[9] When IndyMac Bancorp failed in 2008, uninsured depositors got back 50 cents on the dollar, though they were relatively small. Since then, it seems to be an FDIC goal to get the uninsured depositors paid."

In the 70's and 80's more people invested in real estate than I ever experience.  It was the Real Estate!

The biggest loser, in my opinion, will be the stock market, crypto and other esoteric investments.  Real Estate and Gold the beneficiary.

As before, call or write for any question you may have and think of me of your "in the know real estate agent"

The Problems are the Path

"Why Bear Markets Are Real Estate Buy Signals"

  B ear Markets Are Real Estate Buy Signals Stocks. Bonds. Real Estate. Gold. Commodities. Crypto. These are all “asset classes,” each cons...

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